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ABSTRACT
This study joins the debate of whether Chinese manufacturing has experienced a
significant catch-up with or a process of falling behind the world’s advanced
economies. It calculates a new set of industry-of-origin China-US PPPs for major
manufacturing industries at 1987 prices. Then using a newly constructed data set, it
derives China’s comparative labour productivity level in manufacturing for 1952-97.
The results show that China’s comparative labour productivity increased from about
3.0 in 1952 to 7.6 in 1997 (USA=100), but with a long stagnation at around 4.5
between 1958 and 1990. A clear catch-up process has been observed since the 1990s
when China’s market-oriented reform deepened.
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The post-reform Chinese economy has been one of the few most rapidly growing
economies in the world. Even based on the most critical assessment so far of Chinese
official output statistics, the economy grew at 7.5 percent per annum between 1978
and 1995 (Maddison, 1998), compared with the official figure of 10 percent. This
growth rate is similar to that of Japan in 1952-78 and that of South Korea and Taiwan
in 1952-95 (Maddison, 1998, Tables 3.4 and 3.10). As for the pre-reform period 1952-
78, after Maddison’s downward adjustment, the economy still managed to grow at 4.4
percent a year, compared with the official 6.1 percent a year (1998, p.160), which is
still a respectable growth rate, especially given all the political and economic chaos
that China suffered during that period.
The Catch-up theory argues that countries at low levels of income have a
potentiality for a faster productivity advance than countries at high levels of income
since the former can use the stock of technology already developed by the latter
(Abramovitz, 1986). However, the realisation of catch-up is not guaranteed. It
depends primarily on two factors, namely social capability and technological
congruence. Social capability refers to the availability of an institutional framework,
the capability of government of policy making and political backing, and the human
capital (technological and skills) level of the population, whereas technological
congruence refers to the capability of adopting Western technology (Abramovitz,
1989).
Based on studies focusing on detailed productivity comparisons at sector/industry
level with the world’s productivity leader USA using the ICOP (International
Comparison of Output and Productivity) industry-of-origin purchasing power parity
(PPP) approach,1 it has been found that the post-war Japanese, South Korean and
Taiwanese economies experienced significant catch-up (Pilat, 1994; Timmer and
Szirmai, 1997; Timmer, 2000). Compared with these economies, it is unquestionable
that the post-war Chinese economy differs distinctly in social and economic settings
and has experienced radical, sometimes damaging, policy shifts. We may then ask:
“Compared with the leading economies in the world, has the Chinese economy, whose
leaders vowed in the 1950s to overtake the West in two decades, experienced any
significant catch-up or a process of falling behind?” This is an important question for
China at this time when facing a historical opening to international competition that
will follow its WTO entry.
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 The ICOP approach was developed by a group of researchers led by Angus Maddison at the
University of Groningen. For a brief explanation see Section 2 and for details see Maddison and van
Ark (1988) and van Ark (1993).
2To answer this question this study first estimates a new set of China-US PPPs for
manufacturing branches at 1987 prices using the ICOP industry-of-origin approach. It
then applies the PPP estimates to a newly constructed data set for the gross value
added and labour input in Chinese manufacturing in 1952-97 at industry level to
derive China’s labour productivity in manufacturing in comparison with that of the
USA. We have found that in the entire post-war period, China’s comparative labour
productivity only increased by about 2.1 percent a year. However, the increase was
faster (2.8 percent) during the economic reform period 1978-97 than during the central
planning period 1952-78 (1.5 percent). As a result, China’s comparative labour
productivity level rose from 3.0 in 1952 to 7.6 in 1997 (USA=100). This was,
however, accompanied by a long stagnation at around 4.5 between 1958 and 1990, but
then followed by a clear catch-up process when the market-oriented reform deepened.
More importantly, the results shed some lights on how individual industries performed
in terms of the PPP-implied comparative advantage in Chinese manufacturing and
hence provide an alternative assessment of China’s development policies in both the
central planning and reform periods.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the
theories and previous studies of international comparisons, highlighting the problems
to be tackled in this study. Section 3 presents the ICOP industry-of-origin PPP
approach to the China-US bilateral comparison that is adopted in this study. Section 4
explains the data used and the problems encountered in this study. Section 5 presents








International comparison naturally requires a conversion of the output in national
currencies to a common  	 or an “international currency”. There are mainly
two approaches available for the conversion, namely the market exchange-rate
approach and the PPP approach. The exchange-rate approach (typically the “!
"# $ method”, World Bank, 1999, p.247) is criticised for substantially
underestimating the level of national income for developing countries (Kravis, Heston
and Summers, 1982). This is because in principle exchange rates are mainly a
reflection of purchasing power over tradable goods and services. For these items inter-
country price differences tend to be reduced because of specialisation through trade. In
poor countries where wages are low, nontradable items like health care, building
construction and government services are generally cheaper than in high income
countries. Therefore exchange rates tend to understate the domestic purchasing power
3of the poor countries’ national currencies. Besides, exchange rates can often be
strongly influenced by capital movements and speculations and in recent decades have
been too volatile to serve as reliable indicators of purchasing power (Maddison and
van Ark, 1988).
There are mainly two PPP techniques that have been developed for international
comparison, namely the expenditure PPP approach and the industry-of-origin or
production PPP approach. The PPP in an expenditure framework is most widely
known through the International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations.2 It
can be defined as the number of currency units required in the domestic market to buy
goods and services that one unit of the base-country currency can buy in the base
country (Kravis, Heston and Summers, 1982).3
Although the expenditure approach is useful for the analysis of expenditure
patterns and income levels across countries, it provides no sectoral perspective. For
that purpose the second method, the industry-of-origin or production approach, is
more useful. Developed by the ICOP project at the University of Groningen
(Maddison and van Ark 1988; van Ark 1993),4 this approach takes an integrated view
of input and output quantities, producer prices and the values derived from them.
Unlike the expenditure approach in ICP which uses special surveys, it employs
information from production censuses, input-output tables and national accounts. Its
integrated statistics of quantity, unit value and values permit cross-checks not
available to the expenditure approach in ICP. One of the most important benefits of
this approach is that with appropriate conversion factors (PPPs) derived separately for
individual sectors of the economy, it provides data which can be used for the analysis
of industry-specific productivity performance, structural change and comparative
advantage across countries.
The key concept of the industry-of-origin PPP approach is “unit value ratio”
(UVR) which is derived from the unit values of the same product or product group
between countries being compared. The unit values are obtained by dividing the ex-
factory sales values by the corresponding quantities obtained from each country’s
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 The expenditure PPP approach through ICP has become a regular exercise of several
international organizations such as UN/Eurosat and OECD. The Penn World Tables (Summers and
Heston, 1988, 1991), which supply comparative information on GDP and price levels for 130 countries,
are also based on results from this approach.
3
 The prevailing international income comparison based on expenditure PPP converters was
initiated by pioneering studies by Gilbert and Kravis (1954) and Gilbert and Associates (1958), and
later developed in successive ICP (International Comparison Project) phases by Kravis (1976, 1984),
Kravis, Heston and Summers (1978, 1982), Summers and Heston (1988, 1991). Also see Kravis (1984)
for a complete review of the pre-World War II studies of PPPs.
4
 Based on previous work by Rostas (1948), Paige and Bombach (1959) and Maddison (1970).
4production census or survey. These are in fact the prices used in the ICOP project. As
van Ark (1993) points out, the main advantage of using unit values instead of
specification prices is that the quantities and unit values are consistent with the total
value of output.
%& 			'
The first expenditure-PPP exercise for China in comparison with the United
States was conducted by Kravis (1981) using price and expenditure information for
1975. It was however a “reduced information” exercise because the amount of details
on prices and expenditure in China was significantly less than what is normally
required by ICP standards, and the results were too high to be acceptable in terms of
the value of renminbi yuan.5 Following the procedure similar to that of Kravis, Ren
and Chen (1994) conducted a China-US expenditure-PPP comparison for 1986 with
much better Chinese price and expenditure information than Kravis. A recent revision
of this exercise (Ren, 1997, p.47) has resulted in a yuan/US$ PPP of 0.94 for 1986
(compared to 0.34 by Kravis for the same year).6
Due to difficulties in obtaining the quantity and value data that are necessary for
deriving unit values at commodity or commodity group level, compared with the ICP
approach it is more difficult to apply the ICOP approach to the Chinese economy as a
whole. An earlier effort by Taylor (1991) applies only a pseudo production approach.7
Ren (1997) attempts to make an ICOP PPP comparison between China and the United
States, but ends up with an ICOP-ICP hybrid approach due to insufficient
information.8
Since more Chinese official data became available, there have been two important
studies that follow the standard ICOP PPP approach. One is the China-US agricultural
                                                
5
 The yuan/US$ PPP = 0.34 in 1986 as converted by Ren (1997, p.31). See also comment by
Maddison (1995, pp.167-8).
6
 It should be noted that there were no new PPP estimates for China in the Penn World Tables of
Summers and Heston (1993, PTW 5.5). Their estimates were in fact extrapolated from Kravis’s results
based on official consumption deflators, together with a geometric average of PPPs derived from Ren
and Chen (1994).
7
 Taylor’s study is also considered as a mixture of both expenditure and production approaches, or
an unconventional ICP approach using value added weights (World Bank 1994).
8
 Ren’s matching exercises fell into four categories in terms of the methods used: 1) applying a
standard ICOP PPP method to agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, transport and
telecommunications; 2) applying expenditure PPPs (re-weighted) to wholesales and retails; 3) using a
quantity-indicator approach to derive PPPs for the finance, insurance and real estate sectors; and 4)
using expenditure PPPs as proxies for production PPPs for construction, education, health care, and
government and other services (Ren, 1997, p.43).
5comparison with 1987 as the benchmark by Maddison (1998)9 and the other is the
China-US manufacturing comparison with 1985 as the benchmark by Szirmai and
Ren (2000). Next we concentrate on the latter study as it is more relevant to the
present study.
( !#&)		*
As the first attempt that applies the ICOP industry-of-origin approach to Chinese
manufacturing, the study by Szirmai and Ren (2000), despite various problems mainly
due to data constraints, has laid an important foundation for any further work in this
field.
Using data from the Chinese 1985 industrial census, Szirmai and Ren make 67
product matches in 23 sample industries, representing 13 of the 15 ICOP branches of
manufacturing. The matched value of output represents 37.1 percent of the total gross
value of output in China and 18.9 percent in the USA (2000, Appendix A). Their
estimated yuan/USD PPP for the whole manufacturing sector for 1985 is 1.84 at the
US quantity weights and 1.15 at the Chinese quantity weights, implying a Fisher
average of 1.45 yuan per dollar, compared with the official exchange rate of 2.9 yuan
per dollar (2000, Table 4).
The most striking result from the Szirmai-Ren exercise is that in production PPP
terms and with the USA as the reference country, Chinese manufacturing experienced
no catch-up at all in 1980-92, with an estimated comparative labour productivity value
of 6.3 (USA=100) for 1980 and 6.2 for 1992 (2000, Table 8). However, if taking an
arithmetic mean of the three years at each end of this period, one will get 6.4 for 1980-
82 and 5.7 for 1990-92, indicating a clear decline over time. This result leads to the
authors’ conclusion that as other leading Asian economies exhibited catch-up during
this period, China in fact experienced a process of falling behind in the Asian context.
To understand this conclusion of “no catch up” or “falling behind”, one has to
understand the nature of the Chinese and US data Szirmai and Ren used and the
important adjustments they made to these data in order to estimate branch-level PPPs
for 1985 and conduct the ICOP catch-up accounting for the period 1980-92.
Obviously, the way of deriving PPPs, adjusting value added and employment data,
and deflating nominal output figures can affect the result of the catch up accounting.
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 For reader’s reference, Maddison’s study made 60 farm product matches of 11 branches of
agriculture, representing 89 percent of (FAO) gross value for China and 94 percent for the USA. The
estimated yuan/USD PPP for the 1987 benchmark is 2.313 at Chinese quantity weights and 3.012 at US
quantity weights, implying a Fisher average of 2.639, compared to the official exchange rate of 3.722 in
1987 (Maddison, 1998, Table A.11 and Table A.24).
6Assuming that the US data are less problematic, our discussion below will focus on
likely problems in their treatments of the Chinese data.
First, as the authors have indicated, their PPP (UVR) estimates could be biased
since they were derived using the value and quantity figures of the census that do not
match (2000, p.28). However, the census provides no useful information for one to
gauge the degree of the possible biases. Another and perhaps more important problem
is that output valuation in 1985 was still heavily affected by the price distortions
developed under central planning. Basically, producer goods were underpriced to
serve the government’s heavy industrialisation strategy since the 1950s. Combined
with various forms of subsidies, the effect of the price distortions across industries
was very complex. But, one thing is clear, that is, most industries did not produce
according to their underlying real factor costs. Therefore, it could be misleading if the
estimates were used to conduct the usual ICOP analyses of industry-specific
productivity, structural change and comparative advantage across countries.
Second, the Chinese and US output data they used are conceptually different. The
former, which follows the material product system (MPS), refers to “net industrial
output” (i.e. net material product or NMP), while the latter refers to the “US census
concept of value added” that differs from the SNA concept of value added by
including the “cost of intermediate service inputs from outside the manufacturing
sector” (see Maddison and van Ark, 1988). To make the Chinese and US output data
compatible, Szirmai and Ren first sum up the “net industrial output” and
“depreciation” (approximately equal to the SNA concept of value added) in the
census, and then add their estimates for “material service inputs” based on ratios for
such inputs calculated from the Chinese 1987 Input-Output Table (2000, p.26). This
treatment is also problematic. Since the MPS concept of “net industrial output”
already includes “payments for material services”,10 their treatment has certainly
exaggerated service inputs, and hence overestimated Chinese value added per
labourer, other things being equal.
Third, it is sensible for the authors to consider seriously the upward bias
contained in the SSB (State Statistical Bureau of China) “comparable price”-based
output deflators (See Wu, 2000a). They argue that the SSB industry-specific producer
price indices may serve as better output deflators. Indeed, their calculation shows that,
for example, the real output of Chinese manufacturing grew at 7.6 percent a year in
1980-92, about one third lower than the official rate of 10.9 percent (2000, Table 6).
However, the indices may also have problems, especially for the period under their
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 See Wu (2000a, Appendix A) for a mathematical expression of this problem.
7study. As indicated by the CIESY (China Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbook)
compiler, the indices are constructed with “selected products” from “national key
enterprises” (DITS, 1993, p.268). Although there is no information on how the
product selection is conducted and how the national key enterprises are defined, to
most people’s knowledge, the selected products would be the major ones routinely
reported in CIESY and the “national key enterprises” in the Chinese tradition would
be referring to those who are large in size, definitely state owned, heavy-industry
firms. Here we should realise two things existing before the 1990s. Firstly, compared
with other enterprises, these “key enterprises” were less reformed. Secondly, official
statistical work adjusted gradually to cover more output sold at market prices. These
may have some mixed effects on the SSB industry-specific producer price indices
constructed. On one hand, the indices might tend to understate the actual price
movements in industrial output in general. On the other hand, the likely increase in the
statistical coverage of market prices might tend to overstate the actual price
movements. The net effect is however an empirical question that is not tackled in
Szirmai and Ren (2000).
Fourth, it is also sensible for the authors to remove those employees in the
Chinese census who provide auxiliary services in manufacturing enterprises (e.g.
working in factory-run child care, medical clinic, canteen, etc.), which makes the
Chinese employment data match the US data. Using the information provided in
China’s 1985 Industrial Census, they make a substantial down-scale adjustment of
manufacturing employment by 9.8 percent for 1985 (2000, p.27), which is important
for both their productivity level and catch up analyses. However, they provide no
information on how the adjustment has been made to other years in 1980-92.
'$(

This study attempts to derive the industry-of-origin (production) PPPs for 15
Chinese manufacturing branches using the US as the reference economy and 1987 as
the benchmark year, the time when both the Chinese 1987 Input-Output Survey and
the US 1987 Census of Manufactures were conducted.11 The methodology used in this
study is the same as the one adopted by Szirmai and Ren (2000), which follows van
Ark (1993).
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 We use industry-of-origin PPPs throughout this study which are the same as UVRs used in
Szirmai and Ren (2000).
8To derive China/US industry-of-origin PPPs, two major steps are followed.12
First, the average PPP for an industry + is obtained by weighting the unit value () of





















































)(PPP &&8M is the purchasing power parity of the yuan against the US dollar in
sample industry + at Chinese quantity weights (i.e. the Paasche
weights);
)(PPP 8&8M is the purchasing power parity of the yuan against the US dollar in
industry + at US quantity weights (i.e. the Laspeyres weights).
Second, the aggregation of + industry-level (+=,,) PPP to # branch level is
obtained by taking the weighted average of sample industry PPPs using the gross
values of output (GVO) of the sample industries as weights. The following formulas
are developed especially to take into account the size effect of industries and branches
in aggregation (see van Ark, 1993). The exercise in this step results in two PPPs at
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 In the discussion of estimation procedures, we name the levels of aggregation from the bottom
to the top as: product items/product groups (	), industries (+), branches (#) and the manufacturing sector
as a whole (simply manufacturing). These notations are used throughout this study.
9As discussed previously Fisher geometric average is often used to combine the














All the required data in this study are not directly available from Chinese official
sources, but are based on the author’s estimates in the present and previous studies.
Although the unavoidable data problems have forced us to resort to some
compromises between data availability and methodological ideal, we generally pursue
the spirit of the ICOP approach throughout this study.
.'0 $	1 
 	2 (GVA)
The branch-level GVA data for the benchmark year 1987 are obtained from the
Chinese 1987 Input-Output Table - China’s first SNA-type input-output table. The
figures are reported in Table 1. This means that unlike the study by Szirmai and Ren
(2000, p.26) that adopts the US census concept of value added, this study follows the
SNA concept of value added that does not include the “cost of intermediate service
inputs from outside the manufacturing sector” and hence does not exaggerate
productivity level.13 The branch-level gross value of output (GVO) data for 1987 are
also extracted from the Chinese 1987 Input-Output Table (Table 1). Unlike Szirmai
and Ren who focus on the independent accounting units at the township-and-above
level, both the GVA and GVO data used in this study refer to the national total.
The 1952-97 time series GVA data for individual branches are adopted from Wu
(2000b). His procedures are explained as follows. Firstly, about 200 major industrial
products or product groups, published annually by DITS (Department of Industrial
and Transportation Statistics, SSB), are aggregated to the branch level in the 1987
weights based on detailed ex-factory price data surveyed by SSB (see 2000b).
Secondly, output indices for individual branches are constructed based on the so-
aggregated output series. Thirdly, GVA series for individual branches are derived
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 This makes a significant difference in that the SNA concept value added for US manufacturing
in 1985 (US$804,377 million, BEA, 1998) is only 80.4 percent of that of the US census concept value
added (US$1,000,142 million, Szirmai and Ren, 2000, Table 2).
10
using the SNA-concept value added figures for 1987 from the Chinese 1987 IO Table.
Wu’s estimates have supported the upward bias hypothesis about the SSB output
indices. They show that China’s industrial growth rate is overstated by at least 2
percentage points for the pre-reform period and 3.5 percentage points for the post-
reform period. Wu’s results may contain two major biases, the constant 1987 input-
output ratio assumption and the underlying assumption of constant quality of
products. However, since empirical evidences suggest that while product quality
improves over time the input-output ratios actually declines (2000b, Table 6), the net
effects of the assumptions may be insignificant and the estimates should be justified.
The advantage of using Wu’s indices is that they are to a large extent independent of
official deflators. The estimates for selected years are given in Appendix Table A1.
.1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2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To match the above output data a compatible employment indicator is in order.
However, Chinese official employment data have even more flaws than the output
data in that there is not any employment indicator that could reflect important changes
in China’s employment system and at the same time maintain historical consistency.
China’s statistical authorities have provided no working hour estimates that are
based on regular sample surveys, and have not followed the internationally accepted
unemployment measurement, which makes it very difficult for researchers to properly
measure labour input for productivity analysis. Therefore, problems like ineffective
working hours in many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), largely due to shirking, lack
of job, and short of energy supply, and unemployed workers who remain on the
payroll in all SOEs, largely due to political reason, are inherent in the official data.14
In addition, widely observed data misreporting, tampering and fabricating by local
officials with political incentives have further aggravated the problem. Data
fabrication is a particular problem in small-scale rural enterprises because these
enterprises are not capable of following standard accounting procedures and therefore
the problem is almost impossible to detect.15
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 It should also be noted that China’s official working hours also declined from 48 hours per
week prior to May 1, 1994, to 44 hours between May 1, 1994 and April 30, 1995, and further to 40
hours since May 1, 1995. In recent years, aiming to boost consumption, the authorities have at least
doubled the number of national holidays from 8 to 16 days.
15
 The information here is based on the author’s interviews with senior statisticians in SSB. Some
of them believe that about 40-50% of the reported output and labor data for village level and below-
village level enterprises are flawed. An investigation in 1997, jointly run by several ministries including
SSB, found 75,000 cases violating the state Statistical Law, most of them related to misreporting,
tampering and fabricating data, and most of the worst cases related to small rural industrial enterprises
(3 #!#, No.15/1998, pp.10-12).
11
Our problem is how to clean the mess in official employment statistics. In this
study, we attempt to follow the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department
of Commerce) concept of full-time equivalent employment used in US manufacturing
statistics. Firstly, we base our estimates on an employment indicator “staff and
workers” constructed by DITS that only covers employment in independent
accounting industrial enterprises at or above the rural-township level. We argue that
the overstatement of effective labour input and the inappropriate inclusion of service
labour in the DITS employment could be offset by the inappropriate exclusion of
effective labour input at or below the rural-village level. We feel this argument could
be justified by the following empirical evidences.
Compared with manufacturing employment data reported in the Chinese 1990
Population Census, the DITS indicator for manufacturing “staff and workers”
accounts for about 86 percent of the total found in the census. This suggests that the
DITS indicator has perhaps excluded about 14 percent of the labourers engaged in
manufacturing who worked at or below the village level. Now assume that 50 percent
of the labourers could be discounted in order to get effective labour input (or full-time
equivalent employment) at or below the village level, that is, about 7 percent of the
total. Could this 7 percent be accommodated by the DITS indicator?  Szirmai and Ren
have found that 9.8 percent of the DITS employment figures are auxiliary service
labourers for 1985 (2000, p.27). Taking into account also the previously discussed
problems of ineffective working hours and inappropriate inclusion of unemployed
state workers, we assume at least 12 percent of the DITS employment figures should
be discounted for these reasons, that is, about 10 percent of the total. This is more than
sufficient to accommodate the 7-percent improper exclusion of the effective labour
input at or below the village level.
The DITS series is only available for the period 1985-97. Following the DITS
concept of “staff and workers”, Wu (2000b) has estimated a series for the
manufacturing sector as a whole for 1952-84. Further data work has been undertaken
to obtain the branch-level employment data for the pre-1985 period. Firstly, with the
help of DITS statisticians using mainly unpublished information kept by DITS, the
branch level manufacturing employment figures for SOEs are reconstructed and
adjusted to the current Chinese industrial classification for the whole period in the
study. Based on this work and Wu (2000b), total non-state manufacturing employment
figures are derived. Secondly, with recently disclosed materials in the State Archives
of the 1956 survey on traditional manufacturing and handicrafts, the branch shares of
the non-state employment for 1956 are estimated. Assuming that the branch shares
could be used as a proxy for the 1950s and that there were linear changes in these
shares between 1960 and 1985, we interpolate the shares for this period. Finally, the
12
 non-state employment for each year is allocated to 			  branches according
to the so-estimated branch shares. The so-reconstructed “full-time equivalent”




In this study ex-factory price data instead of unit value data are used to estimate
industry-of-origin PPPs. The data are obtained from an unpublished source containing
ex-factory prices of about 2000 industrial products surveyed by SSB covering the
period 1985-97 (Wu, 2000b). We choose not to use the unit values estimated by
Szirmai and Ren (2000) based on the 1985 industrial census because we believe their
estimates could not capture the significant effects of the price adjustments or the
newly introduced market-planning dual track price system during 1986-87 which
substantially removed the existing price distortions developed in the central planning
period. Besides, there is no time-matching problem using the 1987 ex-factory price
data because the US manufacturing census was conducted in the same year, whereas
in Szirmai-Ren the 1987 US census data have to be roughly adjusted to match the
1985 Chinese industrial census data.
There are no quantity data that could exactly match the ex-factory price data. To
obtain proper quantity data for weighting, two data sources are used. One is the
physical output of 200 major industrial products/product groups published by DITS
(SSB), which Wu (2000b) uses for constructing the real output indices, and the other
is the relatively more detailed physical output data reported by various industrial






































Food and Beverages 155,779 29,174 4,807 6,069 317,171 79,098 1,594 49,622
(12.5) (7.5) (7.8) (96) (13.0) (8.9) (8.4) (106)
Tobacco Products 28,918 19,405 267 72,650 24,869 10,353 54 191,722
(2.3) (5.0) (0.4) (1,150) (1.0) (1.2) (0.3) (409)
Textile Mill Products 166,207 42,592 8,529 4,994 62,406 20,137 718 28,046
(13.4) (10.9) (13.8) (79) (2.6) (2.3) (3.8) (60)
Wearing Apparel 31,037 9,124 2,176 4,193 63,290 23,031 1,086 21,207
(2.5) (2.3) (3.5) (66) (2.6) (2.6) (5.7) (45)
Leather Products & Footwear 15,539 4,523 976 4,635 8,812 3,939 147 26,796
(1.2) (1.2) (1.6) (73) (0.4) (0.4) (0.8) (57)
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 21,557 6,864 1,545 4,443 108,857        46,685 1,325 35,234
(1.7) (1.8) (2.5) (70) (4.5) (5.3) (7.0) (75)
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 44,329 14,271 2,499 5,710 246,455        99,830 2,132 46,825
(3.6) (3.7) (4.0) (90) (10.1) (11.2) (11.2) (100)
Petroleum Refineries 36,436 15,930 449 35,448 138,141 22,051 160 137,819
(2.9) (4.1) (0.7) (561) (5.6) (2.5) (0.8) (294)
Chemical Products 140,857 46,296 4,836 9,574 216,173 83,802 1,013 82,727
(11.3) (11.9) (7.8) (152) (8.8) (9.4) (5.3) (176)
Rubber & Plastic Products 46,805 13,735 2,156 6,369 86,110 29,580 848 34,882
(3.8) (3.5) (3.5) (101) (3.5) (3.3) (4.5) (74)
Building Materials 80,025 32,796 7,391 4,437 60,125 23,313 561 41,556
(6.4) (8.4) (12.0) (70) (2.5) (2.6) (3.0) (89)
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 157,056 50,825 6,621 7,677 265,543        97,135 2,127 45,668
(12.6) (13.0) (10.7) (122) (10.9) (10.9) (11.2) (97)
Machinery & Transport Equipment 179,976 61,183 12,502 4,894 541,850      208,890 4,063 51,413
(14.5) (15.7) (20.3) (77) (22.2) (23.5) (21.4) (110)
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 106,371 28,587 4,802 5,953 207,254 87,640 1,763 49,711
(8.6) (7.3) (7.8) (94) (8.5) (9.9) (9.3) (106)
Other Manufacturing 32,557 14,769 2,185 6,760 98,291        53,108 1,367 38,850
(2.6) (3.8) (3.5) (107) (4.0) (6.0) (7.2) (83)
Total Manufacturing 1,243,451 390,072 61,740 6,318 2,445,349 888,592 18,958 46,872
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100)
: Data for China are calculated based on Wu (2000b, 2001) and the discussion in the text. Data for US are calculated based on BEA (1998). See the discussion in the text.





The basic data on manufacturing GVA for 1952-97 are the BEA annual chained
estimates of Gross Product Originating by industry, which is a new method to replace
the fixed weights to calculate constant price GDP (GVA) indices. An important
property of chain-type quantity indices is that the implied growth rates are not affected
by a shift in the benchmark year and that chain-type indices incorporate the changes in
the industry-composition.16 In this regard, our fixed-weight (1987) Chinese GVA data
are not exactly compatible with the US GVA data. We do not attempt to correct for
this incompatibility because a) it is not important for our purpose in this study and b)
there are no data that allow such correction.
The new BEA GVA data are not available for the period 1952-97. The Groningen
Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) has produced a 1987-based series that
satisfies our needs. The work by GGDC also takes into account the differences
between the 1972 SIC (Standard of Industrial Classification) and the 1987 SIC, and
adjusted the series under the former (1952-86) to the latter (Inklarr and Timmer,
2001). In this study we adopt the GGDC-adjusted series of GVA. The 1987
benchmark figures are given in Table 1. The GGDC-adjusted figures for selected
years are given in Appendix Table A2. The 1987 benchmark branch-level GVO data
are also obtained from BEA (1998) (Table 1).
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The full-time equivalent employment data by branch are originally constructed by
BEA (1998). The only adjustment that needs to be made to this series is the
conversion of the 1972 SIC-based series (1952-86) to the 1987 SIC. We also adopt the
conversion made by GGDC (Inklaar and Timmer, 2001). The GGDC-adjusted figures
for selected years are reported in Appendix Table A2. The 1987 benchmark figures
are reported in Table 1.
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 The downside of chain type indices is that they are not additive, that is, the sum of the parts of
the aggregate is not equal to the aggregate itself. Normally, the further they are away from the
benchmark year, the bigger is the discrepancy, and typically, the higher is the sum of the components
relative to the total the further back in time (Inklaar and Timmer, 2001). However, this problem is not a




Calculation of the unit values of matched products is based on product-specific
gross value of output and quantity of output. They are obtained from the US 1987




Following the ICOP PPP estimation steps explained in Section 3, we have
calculated China/US production PPPs for each branch in manufacturing for the
benchmark year 1987 (Table 2). In this exercise 66 product or product-group matches
of 39 sample industries are made. These sample-industry PPPs are then aggregated
into 14 manufacturing branches that have been used in ICOP studies. The PPPs for
Chinese manufacturing as a whole at both Chinese and US weights are the weighted
average of branch PPPs with gross value of output as weights. They are also used as
proxies for the “other manufacturing” branch. The results reported in Table 2 also
include the calculation of Fisher (geometric mean) PPPs.
The matched value of output in this comparison represents 35.7 percent of the
gross value of output in China and 17.2 percent in the USA (see Appendix Table A3),
which is similar to the coverage in Szirmai and Ren (2000) of 37.1 and 18.9 percent,
respectively. This coverage is fairly reasonable given the usual data problems in this
kind of exercise and is in line with similar exercises for the former centrally planned
economies.17
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 For example, the corresponding figures are 18.5 percent and 16.3 percent for a USSR/US
comparison, 32.0 and 23.2 for a Czechoslovakia/West Germany comparison, 33.1 and 19.3 for a
Hungary/West Germany comparison, and 33.6 and 19.4 for a Poland/West Germany comparison
(Kouwenhoven, 1996, Table 5). Even for industrialized market economies, the coverage is not high.
For example, a West Germany/US comparison by van Ark and Pilat (1993) manages to cover only 24.4
percent of West Germany’s manufacturing output and 24.8 percent of US manufacturing output.
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Industry-of-Origin PPPs and Price Levels by Major Manufacturing Branch, China/USA, 1987

















Food Products 1.92 2.43 2.16 0.58 0.38
Beverages 2.63 1.99 2.29 0.62 0.40
(Food and Beverages) (2.02) (2.35) (2.18) (0.59) (0.38)
Tobacco Products 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.21 0.14
Textile Mill Products 0.57 1.02 0.76 0.21 0.14
Wearing Apparel 1.12 1.12 1.12 0.30 0.20
Leather Products & Footwear 1.95 2.63 2.26 0.61 0.40
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 7.96 7.90 7.93 2.13 1.39
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 3.59 3.73 3.66 0.98 0.64
Petroleum Refineries 3.27 4.69 3.92 1.05 0.69
Chemical Products 4.78 4.56 4.67 1.26 0.82
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.65 2.28 1.21 0.33 0.21
Building Materials 2.35 1.93 2.13 0.57 0.37
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 2.89 5.17 3.87 1.04 0.68
Machinery & Transport Equipment 1.95 6.57 3.58 0.96 0.63
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 5.42 5.49 5.45 1.47 0.96
Total Manufacturing 1.97 4.92 3.11 0.84 0.55
Official Exchange Rate 3.72 3.72 3.72 n.a. n.a.
Market Exchange Rate* 5.70 5.70 5.70 n.a. n.a.
& : Author’s estimation. See Section 3 for methodology and Section 4 for the data used.
:: *Referring to China’s foreign exchange “swap market” rate for 1987 (Wu, 1998b). n.a. = Not
applicable.
As shown in Table 2, the average PPP for total manufacturing is 3.11 yuan per
US dollar for 1987 which is lower than but not significantly different from the then
prevailing official (planning-controlled) exchange rate of 3.72 yuan. By contrast,
Szirmai and Ren (2000) estimate a PPP as 1.45 for 1985, which is only 50 percent of
the official exchange rate of 2.90. It may be argued that for a centrally planned
economy the spread between average PPP and official exchange rate should not be so
large as estimated in Szirmai and Ren. This is because exchange rate control has to be,
by its nature, associated with price control, or the level of controlled exchange rate has
to be close to the average production costs that can be reflected by PPP estimates.18 If
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 A study on the Soviet manufacturing by Kouwenhoven (1996, Table 4) also finds that at the
1987 benchmark the PPP of ruble (0.455 ruble = US$1) is not significantly different from the official
(planning-controlled) exchange rate of ruble (0.523 ruble = US$1).
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this is true, then Szirmai and Ren may have underestimated the yuan/USD PPP or
overestimated the value of yuan.
Studies on export costs in China may also shed some light on this discussion,
even though the estimation of Chinese export costs does not follow production
approach and hence provides no sector/industry perspective. Lardy (1992) estimates
the average costs of Chinese exports to be 3.67 yuan per US dollar for 1985 and 4.20
for 1987, whereas using a CPI (consumer price index) method Wu (1998) arrives at
4.50 and 5.37, respectively. These estimates could be compared with China’s effective
exchange rates of 3.49 and 4.17, respectively, which are adjusted by the planning and
market shares in foreign exchange transactions. These studies show that official
exchange rate was often forced to adjust to changes in export costs. The depreciation
of yuan in 1985-87, from 2.90 down to 3.72 yuan per US dollar, was an attempt to
make such an adjustment (Wu, 1998, Table 2).
It is not surprising that the average PPP for manufacturing is only 55 percent of
the yuan’s market exchange rate (yuan/USD PPP of 3.11 versus yuan/USD exchange
rate of 5.70), or the yuan’s domestic purchasing power is about 1.8 times its
international purchasing power, because the latter largely reflects the prices of the
tradables, which are mainly on the “market track” under the prevailing dual-track
price system.
5 *		9	$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PPP estimates can reflect the relative costs of, and hence comparative advantage
in, manufacturing of the countries being compared. As shown in Table 2, the lowest
PPP is found in Chinese textiles (0.76), followed by tobacco products (0.77) and
wearing apparel (1.12), largely reflecting low costs and comparative advantage of
these products produced in China. For most of the branches with high PPPs (higher
than official exchange rate as given in Table 2) China has obviously no comparative
advantage. They include wood products, for which the highest PPP was found (7.93),
followed by electrical-electronic machinery (5.45), chemical products (4.67),
petroleum refineries (3.92) and basic and fabricated metal products (3.87).
Using US prices as references, China’s relative price levels across manufacturing
branches can be derived by comparing the PPP estimates with Chinese official and
market exchange rates. Reported in the last columns of Table 2, these price levels can
also serve as indicators of China’s relative costs of, and hence comparative advantage
in, individual manufacturing branches.
Another point to address is that the PPPs with US quantity weights are found
higher than the PPPs with Chinese quantity weights. This is similar to the pattern
found by Szirmai and Ren (2000), which is expected in bilateral comparisons between
18
rich and poor countries. Due to differences in both production structure and consumer
preferences, products which are relatively cheap and common in the USA will tend to
be expensive and rare in countries like China and vice versa. Therefore, at least
theoretically, industries with high PPPs (low-value yuan) should receive high quantity
weights in the USA and low weights in China, whereas industries with low PPPs
(high-value yuan) should receive low weights in the US and high weights in China.
There are some good examples to support this theory in our findings. Referring to
Tables 1 and 2, branches with high PPPs or factor costs in China, such as manufacture
of wood and paper, account for larger shares in total manufacturing output in the USA
than in China, whereas branches with low PPPs or factor costs in China, such as
textiles and building materials, account for smaller shares in the USA than in China.
There are, however, some interesting exceptions in our findings. The output share of
wearing apparel and rubber-plastics products seems too low in China if judged by the
 PPPs of these branches and the output share of metal products and machinery
seems too high if assessed by the 	2 PPPs of these branches. This clearly reflects the
structural distortions resulting from the government’s costly industrial strategy under
central planning that focused on heavy industries at the expense of light industries.
5( 	 		
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#
Applying the estimated PPPs in Table 2 to Chinese and US gross value added
(GVA) in Table 1, we can examine Chinese and US output level on a comparative
basis, because this approach measures Chinese and US manufacturing outputs using
the same set of prices. Such a PPP-based comparison can to a large extent correct for
the underestimation of Chinese GDP due to price distortions. The derived
comparative GVAs can show the position (scale) of Chinese manufacturing industries
relative to that of the USA.
As reported in Table 3, at the 1987 benchmark, total Chinese manufacturing
output was about 15.9 percent of the US level in GVA.19 The estimates suggest that
the largest manufacturing branch in China in 1987 was textiles which was about 2.8
times the US textiles industry, followed by tobacco (2.4 times), building materials (66
percent), leather-footwear (51 percent), rubber-plastics (38 percent) and wearing
apparel (36 percent), whereas the smallest branch in China was wood products which
was only less than 2 percent of the US level, followed by paper-printing industry (3.9
percent), electrical-electronic equipment (6.0 percent) and machinery (8.2 percent).
                                                
19
 If measured in gross value of output (GVO), which can be done following the same approach
with the GVO data in Table 1, China’s relative position would be 18.9 percent of the US level, or
roughly one fifth of the size of US manufacturing in 1987 (PPP) dollars.
19
Because of the importance of manufacturing for any economy in general and for these
two countries in particular, these findings suggest the strength of the Chinese
economy relative to that of the USA. Undoubtedly, there is still an enormous gap for
the Chinese to fill.
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Gross Value Added (GVA) by Major Manufacturing Branch at 1987 Chinese and US Producer Prices,
and China/USA Comparative Output Level (USA=100)






















Food Products & Beverages 29,174 185,608 15.72 14,436 79,098 18.25 16.94
Tobacco Products 19,405 7,972 243.42 25,201 10,353 243.42 243.42
Textile Mill Products 42,592 20,584 206.91 74,685 20,137 370.89 277.02
Wearing Apparel 9,124 25,683 35.53 8,182 23,031 35.53 35.53
Leather Products & Footwear 4,523 10,360 43.66 2,320 3,939 58.89 50.71
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 6,864 369,013 1.86 863 46,685 1.85 1.85
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 14,271 372,666 3.83 3,974 99,830 3.98 3.90
Petroleum Refineries 15,930 103,473 15.40 4,875 22,051 22.11 18.45
Chemical Products 46,296 382,011 12.12 9,681 83,802 11.55 11.83
Rubber & Plastic Products 13,735 67,426 20.37 21,281 29,580 71.94 38.28
Building Materials 32,796 45,098 72.72 13,972 23,313 59.93 66.02
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 50,825 502,267 10.12 17,588 97,135 18.11 13.54
Machinery & Transport Equipment 61,183 1,372,060 4.46 31,301 208,890 14.98 8.17
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 28,587 481,057 5.94 5,274 87,640 6.02 5.98
Other Manufacturing 14,769 261,291 5.65 7,497 53,108 14.12 8.93
Total Manufacturing 390,072 4,206,569 9.27 241,129 888,592 27.14 15.86
& : Derived based on data in Table 1 and the PPP estimates in Table 2.
The same approach can be used to derive comparative labour productivity for
individual manufacturing branches in China. The results are reported in Table 4. At
the 1987 benchmark, Chinese comparative labour productivity in manufacturing was
4.3 percent of the US level (USA=100), which is a Fisher average of 2.7 at Chinese
producer prices and 6.8 at US producer prices. This is lower than the 5.7 percent
estimated by Szirmai and Ren (2000), which could be due to any of the factors or the
combined effect of them discussed in the data section.20
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 This is also lower than 7.9 percent estimated for India (1986) by van Ark (1991), 10 percent for
Indonesia (1987) by Szirmai (1994) and 26.4 percent for South Korea (1987) by Pilat (1994). However,




Labour Productivity (GVA per Employed Person) by Major Manufacturing Branch at 1987 Chinese
and US Producer Prices, and China/USA Comparative Labour Productivity Level (USA=100)


















Food Products & Beverages 6,069 116,442 5.21 3,003 49,622 6.05 5.62
Tobacco Products 72,650 147,626 49.21 94,350 191,722 49.21 49.21
Textile Mill Products 4,994 28,669 17.42 8,757 28,046 31.22 23.32
Wearing Apparel 4,193 23,649 17.73 3,760 21,207 17.73 17.73
Leather Products & Footwear 4,635 70,473 6.58 2,377 26,796 8.87 7.64
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 4,443 278,500 1.60 558 35,234 1.58 1.59
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 5,710 174,796 3.27 1,590 46,825 3.40 3.33
Petroleum Refineries 35,448 646,708 5.48 10,848 137,819 7.87 6.57
Chemical Products 9,574 377,108 2.54 2,002 82,727 2.42 2.48
Rubber & Plastic Products 6,369 79,511 8.01 9,869 34,882 28.29 15.05
Building Materials 4,437 80,389 5.52 1,890 41,556 4.55 5.01
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 7,677 236,139 3.25 2,656 45,668 5.82 4.35
Machinery & Transport Equipment 4,894 337,696 1.45 2,504 51,413 4.87 2.66
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 5,953 272,863 2.18 1,098 49,711 2.21 2.20
Other Manufacturing 6,760 191,142 3.54 3,432 38,850 8.83 5.59
Total Manufacturing 6,318 230,608 2.74 3,207 46,872 6.84 4.33
& : Derived based on data in Table 1 and the PPP estimates in Table 2.
In 1987, the manufacturing branches with low comparative labour productivity,
and hence no comparative advantage, were, not so surprisingly, wood products (only
1.6 percent of the US level), machinery-transportation equipment (2.7 percent),
chemical products (2.5) and electrical-electronic equipment (2.2), whereas the
branches with high comparative labour productivity, and hence strong comparative
advantage, were tobacco (49.2), textiles (23.3), wearing apparel (17.7) and rubber-
plastics (15.1). Compared with the findings in Tables 2 and 3, these suggest that in
most cases, the manufacturing branches (such as tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel,
rubber-plastics) that have lower PPPs tend to enjoy higher comparative labour
productivity and larger share in output, which is in line with the theory. We shall
further examine this in a dynamic perspective.
5. 	 		
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Following exactly the techniques used in deriving the 1987-benchmark output
and labour productivity, estimates for 1952-97 are obtained using the time series of
output and labour input introduced in Section 4. The estimates for the comparative
output (GVA) level of Chinese manufacturing are reported in Table 5 and the
estimates for the comparative labour productivity level of Chinese manufacturing are
reported in Table 6. Readers are reminded to closely follow the concept of “China-US
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comparative level” in the discussion below to avoid being overwhelmed by the
common sense of “growth” in a dynamic perspective. For example, a decline in
Chinese comparative output or labour productivity over a certain period is a decline in
	 rather than   terms. It declines because it grows not as fast as that of
the USA or it declines more rapidly than that of the USA. The same should be applied
to an increase in comparative output and productivity. Chinese electronic industry
(grouped with electrical equipment in this study) is a good example. Its labour
productivity in   terms grew at 16.6 percent a year in 1987-97, one of the fast
growing industries, but in 	 terms it only grew at 2.8 percent a year, which
means that its growth was only 2.8 percentage points faster than that of the US
counterpart (see Appendix Table A4).
Over the entire period 1952-97, as shown in Table 5, the comparative output
level of Chinese manufacturing (the USA=100) increased from 2.9 to 27.8, up by 5.1
percent per annum, with an increase by 4.7 percent per annum for the pre-reform
period 1952-78 and an increase by 5.7 percent per annum for the post-reform period
1978-97. During the central planning period the branches that grew fastest were
metals, machinery and electrical-electronic equipment, while during the reform period
wearing apparel, leather and footwear, tobacco, building materials and food grew
fastest. These findings generally reflect the policy orientation of the two periods, that
is, heavy industry-oriented industrialisation under central planning and light industry-
oriented development during economic reform.
In terms of the relative size (with the USA=100) of branches, in 1977 (the time
representing the pre-reform level) there was only one branch that was larger than the
US counterpart, that is, textiles with a size of 1.7 times the US size. By 1997, there
were 6 branches that were either greater or similar to the US level. They are, by the
relative size, textiles (450), tobacco (445), leather-footwear (319), wearing apparel
(214), building materials (128) and rubber-plastics (93) which are all labour-intensive
indeed. On the other hand, branches at about or below 20 percent of the US level are
wood (5), paper-printing (10), electrical-electronic (10), machinery (14) and metals
(22) which rely more on either natural resources or capital and technology.
By far, the findings seem to well conform to the theory of comparative advantage.
However, we are not so sure until we know whether the performance of comparative
labour productivity in Chinese manufacturing can show a clear sign of catch up
(falling behind) of the branches that grew faster (slower) during the economic reform.      
22
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1952 2.93 2.34 15.23 155.74 8.56 2.23 1.58 0.36 4.54 1.58 3.13 4.55 0.41 0.30 0.27 3.16
1953 3.53 2.71 22.13 198.20 10.37 2.63 2.32 0.40 4.82 1.82 3.89 5.46 0.49 0.48 0.44 4.97
1954 4.22 2.93 24.79 229.47 12.32 3.85 2.76 0.47 5.35 2.47 5.44 6.94 0.74 0.61 0.49 4.27
1955 3.73 3.17 22.31 194.13 9.57 3.51 2.13 0.48 5.36 2.40 4.99 7.40 0.79 0.65 0.44 2.84
1956 4.70 3.28 23.03 233.63 12.39 4.29 2.79 0.59 5.77 2.90 5.84 8.76 1.15 1.22 0.67 4.15
1957 4.97 3.53 25.25 227.45 11.00 5.51 2.72 0.75 6.58 3.28 7.19 11.30 1.49 1.42 1.22 5.02
1958 7.97 4.84 25.21 298.11 14.37 6.46 4.29 1.01 7.15 4.42 12.11 10.28 2.94 5.24 4.02 6.73
1959 9.07 5.78 27.50 322.53 15.80 6.52 4.49 1.29 7.03 5.31 9.94 10.97 4.19 5.85 5.88 9.68
1960 8.94 4.25 21.75 245.04 11.01 7.92 5.23 1.35 7.57 6.02 10.56 13.32 5.50 7.22 6.66 11.58
1961 4.52 2.61 11.83 134.56 6.43 4.87 2.62 0.81 8.10 3.08 7.17 8.95 3.03 2.23 2.13 5.84
1962 3.54 2.67 10.96 102.78 7.16 3.42 2.20 0.79 8.33 2.97 7.91 8.97 2.27 0.98 1.18 4.74
1963 3.90 2.78 14.40 104.41 7.48 3.64 2.32 0.85 8.95 3.53 8.69 9.38 2.38 0.98 0.97 5.16
1964 4.62 3.77 19.15 136.07 8.68 3.33 2.55 0.88 9.67 4.17 9.70 10.29 2.54 1.27 0.98 5.89
1965 5.30 4.21 22.38 163.49 9.91 3.20 2.48 1.02 10.19 5.04 10.48 11.04 2.91 1.55 1.01 7.03
1966 5.83 4.35 24.89 173.61 10.50 4.33 2.39 1.16 11.08 6.01 10.96 11.93 3.31 1.87 1.47 8.25
1967 4.91 4.11 21.83 158.03 9.93 5.32 2.46 1.09 12.31 4.61 9.79 9.54 2.24 1.15 1.12 7.59
1968 4.39 3.94 22.90 147.20 7.54 5.23 1.84 0.93 13.26 3.45 8.43 8.29 1.95 1.10 0.83 6.29
1969 5.66 3.67 29.21 187.05 8.21 6.24 2.03 1.08 15.35 4.77 10.66 10.45 2.84 1.79 1.55 7.18
1970 7.52 4.15 31.85 198.95 9.10 9.17 2.31 1.27 14.77 5.71 15.63 13.92 4.26 3.66 3.00 8.10
1971 7.92 4.37 27.85 183.67 10.17 9.67 2.24 1.35 15.49 6.22 15.07 16.18 5.30 4.64 3.46 7.63
1972 7.61 4.66 28.83 166.22 10.20 10.19 2.02 1.35 17.69 6.28 14.66 15.97 5.21 4.53 3.27 7.40
1973 7.51 4.83 31.37 177.89 10.64 10.57 1.67 1.37 18.64 6.13 14.78 15.10 4.85 4.63 3.16 8.25
1974 7.73 6.00 31.98 189.64 11.70 10.67 1.75 1.37 21.75 6.30 15.66 15.96 4.33 4.81 3.70 8.37
1975 9.69 6.13 35.12 231.11 13.99 12.79 2.03 1.66 24.26 7.26 20.50 21.30 6.08 6.51 4.32 9.60
1976 8.50 5.67 34.86 181.42 13.87 11.84 1.69 1.53 24.97 5.98 19.80 19.32 4.95 5.55 3.72 8.66
1977 8.93 6.51 44.72 170.77 13.38 14.11 1.82 1.59 25.01 6.47 19.53 22.13 5.40 5.53 3.24 8.45
1978 9.72 6.67 41.39 184.71 11.61 15.21 1.74 1.78 37.65 7.75 21.75 24.50 6.83 6.07 3.81 8.56




































1980 11.31 7.38 56.44 213.03 16.39 24.45 2.24 2.19 35.54 10.41 25.73 32.57 7.70 6.05 3.44 9.06
1981 11.15 9.25 58.99 229.08 17.74 29.24 2.25 2.20 20.00 9.98 22.53 36.78 7.04 5.32 3.00 8.88
1982 12.74 9.50 79.72 252.65 18.67 27.43 2.48 2.39 24.17 10.54 27.55 50.38 9.61 6.44 3.15 9.00
1983 12.93 10.15 105.24 220.85 17.20 27.76 2.23 2.55 19.28 9.96 30.78 47.67 11.25 7.18 3.63 8.71
1984 12.78 12.22 124.50 218.24 18.05 30.97 2.12 2.79 18.41 10.76 31.88 47.83 10.66 7.32 3.99 7.83
1985 14.16 13.75 146.45 248.14 20.66 37.47 2.08 3.26 16.78 12.26 34.79 53.54 11.57 8.17 5.57 7.97
1986 15.60 16.18 191.22 265.42 42.80 50.01 1.92 3.54 27.07 12.07 37.62 58.02 12.81 7.78 5.28 8.97
1987 15.86 16.94 243.42 277.02 35.53 50.71 1.85 3.90 18.45 11.83 38.28 66.02 13.54 8.17 5.98 8.93
1988 16.64 18.28 280.20 303.45 42.86 51.86 1.89 4.20 18.59 12.92 41.86 73.34 13.43 8.97 6.69 8.12
1989 16.92 19.43 350.39 313.85 43.61 51.39 1.83 4.44 15.63 13.39 40.40 71.56 14.37 8.39 6.27 8.66
1990 16.84 17.53 433.79 280.99 47.32 60.36 1.81 4.68 27.61 13.32 42.40 70.72 15.64 7.52 5.90 8.57
1991 19.35 19.98 534.39 301.83 54.72 71.48 1.88 5.15 34.81 14.70 49.17 89.83 17.94 9.52 6.61 9.48
1992 21.86 22.87 653.85 290.26 62.54 94.84 2.04 5.99 37.02 15.90 55.72 94.61 19.85 11.93 7.91 11.18
1993 24.24 24.77 693.64 306.60 93.93 144.37 2.65 6.62 41.04 17.58 63.63 113.22 21.01 12.92 9.14 14.97
1994 26.25 25.37 473.18 311.75 113.54 182.19 2.60 7.26 37.72 17.33 75.45 117.39 20.77 15.19 13.65 14.91
1995 31.80 26.44 423.69 433.84 261.21 336.43 7.70 10.46 33.89 22.06 82.61 134.07 20.98 20.29 11.92 20.59
1996 28.71 28.45 437.23 393.76 191.05 328.99 4.78 9.59 33.01 21.12 100.84 136.93 21.20 18.00 9.44 18.11
1997 27.80 29.43 444.67 450.39 213.99 319.26 5.02 9.91 42.03 22.84 93.02 128.28 21.71 14.20 10.01 19.76
1952-57 11.15 8.56 10.65 7.87 5.14 19.82 11.48 15.47 7.71 15.74 18.11 19.96 29.46 36.88 35.03 9.68
1958-62 -6.53 -5.44 -15.37 -14.69 -8.24 -9.09 -4.19 1.12 4.82 -1.96 1.91 -4.51 8.83 -7.16 -0.63 -1.15
1963-65 14.34 16.42 26.86 16.74 11.47 -2.19 4.12 8.83 6.97 19.34 9.84 7.14 8.62 16.33 -4.87 14.02
1966-70 7.26 -0.27 7.31 4.00 -1.70 23.41 -1.42 4.53 7.71 2.51 8.32 4.76 7.92 18.79 24.25 2.87
1971-78 3.27 6.12 3.33 -0.92 3.09 6.54 -3.48 4.29 12.40 3.89 4.21 7.32 6.08 6.55 3.03 0.70
1979-87 5.59 10.90 21.76 4.61 13.23 14.31 0.70 9.15 -7.62 4.81 6.49 11.64 7.89 3.35 5.13 0.47
1988-97 5.77 5.68 6.21 4.98 19.67 20.20 10.48 9.77 8.58 6.80 9.28 6.87 4.84 5.68 5.28 8.26
1952-78 4.72 4.12 3.92 0.66 1.18 7.66 0.37 6.30 8.48 6.31 7.74 6.69 11.44 12.32 10.71 3.90
1979-97 5.68 8.12 13.31 4.80 16.57 17.37 5.73 9.47 0.58 5.85 7.95 9.10 6.27 4.57 5.21 4.50
1952-97 5.13 5.79 7.79 2.39 7.41 11.66 2.60 7.63 5.07 6.12 7.83 7.70 9.23 8.98 8.35 4.15
: Derived based on PPP estimates in Table 2 and the basic time series data for China and the USA as explained in Section 4.
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Comparative Performance of Chinese Manufacturing: Gross Value Added per Employed Person in 1987 PPPs by Major Manufacturing Branch, China versus USA,


































1952 3.04 6.54 31.23 93.22 7.96 4.93 0.90 1.25 56.07 6.40 35.35 4.43 0.78 1.45 2.53 1.65
1953 3.56 6.63 36.54 110.45 9.20 5.35 1.22 1.30 43.39 6.39 37.91 4.69 0.92 2.18 3.95 2.52
1954 3.60 6.17 37.31 106.29 9.05 6.70 1.15 1.34 40.19 8.32 48.06 5.43 1.11 2.34 3.76 1.94
1955 3.59 4.18 31.29 107.55 10.43 7.91 0.95 1.41 39.53 8.32 47.72 4.83 1.59 2.61 3.54 1.56
1956 4.81 4.66 30.06 123.30 16.28 10.18 1.51 1.78 34.94 7.37 39.31 5.07 2.39 3.66 4.18 2.73
1957 5.18 4.93 29.30 115.03 14.35 12.80 1.38 2.16 47.72 7.96 45.45 7.03 2.93 4.03 7.16 3.37
1958 3.44 3.19 22.22 96.55 16.32 9.60 3.40 1.44 19.64 1.74 21.41 1.51 0.89 4.15 7.93 3.19
1959 5.09 4.24 20.25 113.19 23.82 11.90 4.36 2.07 14.50 2.45 20.04 2.14 1.98 5.22 13.24 5.63
1960 5.31 3.35 26.00 90.26 17.57 13.51 4.89 2.61 15.45 2.99 22.96 2.90 2.40 5.62 13.68 5.61
1961 3.45 2.57 14.75 57.15 9.55 8.30 1.74 1.88 19.63 2.56 16.48 2.83 2.23 2.15 5.47 4.38
1962 3.72 3.08 15.98 54.89 13.99 7.78 1.83 2.34 20.05 3.17 22.22 4.41 2.78 1.32 4.26 4.56
1963 4.15 3.69 23.07 53.53 12.28 7.23 1.37 2.45 23.65 5.31 24.91 5.75 3.62 1.47 3.58 4.15
1964 4.66 4.80 30.10 62.51 14.24 6.85 1.49 2.53 23.88 5.98 28.37 5.94 3.96 1.88 3.42 4.19
1965 5.21 5.03 34.07 74.58 17.53 7.13 1.65 3.01 22.68 6.11 32.28 5.37 4.25 2.23 3.43 4.75
1966 5.70 4.99 35.93 78.99 17.69 9.53 1.51 3.41 24.09 6.92 35.96 5.39 4.74 2.76 5.34 5.29
1967 4.68 4.88 31.45 72.74 18.27 11.45 1.70 3.28 25.02 5.15 29.21 3.67 3.20 1.53 3.86 4.84
1968 4.08 4.77 31.67 69.53 15.03 11.80 1.40 2.84 26.12 3.64 26.50 3.11 2.71 1.39 2.59 3.85
1969 4.74 4.18 38.15 81.97 15.17 12.03 1.49 2.98 29.56 4.53 31.25 3.24 3.65 1.98 4.26 3.77
1970 5.32 4.32 36.57 77.77 16.31 14.15 1.68 3.13 23.81 4.09 38.98 3.88 4.36 2.98 5.35 3.55
1971 4.81 3.93 26.22 64.18 16.26 12.36 1.53 2.78 20.14 3.52 30.75 3.71 4.33 2.79 4.43 3.50
1972 4.48 3.95 26.18 58.26 16.77 11.92 1.52 2.64 18.44 3.21 27.49 3.26 4.14 2.52 3.85 3.41
1973 4.40 3.89 28.21 61.85 17.06 11.42 1.29 2.62 19.04 2.99 26.43 2.87 4.05 2.63 3.89 3.85
1974 4.31 4.52 27.06 61.42 17.82 10.13 1.35 2.47 21.36 2.85 24.76 2.69 3.54 2.63 4.41 3.88
1975 4.52 4.28 25.31 60.76 21.21 9.94 1.60 2.66 21.79 2.91 23.03 2.81 4.23 2.86 3.99 4.10
1976 3.77 3.80 23.09 49.48 23.16 9.16 1.62 2.35 20.30 2.25 21.58 2.34 3.39 2.31 3.37 2.74
1977 4.05 4.26 27.20 44.67 24.00 10.41 2.20 2.45 19.95 2.32 21.39 2.56 3.77 2.27 2.95 3.69
1978 4.51 4.51 24.74 47.93 25.71 10.86 3.98 2.78 29.29 2.73 22.45 2.64 5.03 2.46 3.59 3.74




































1980 4.70 4.52 28.07 37.05 14.92 9.53 2.48 2.49 23.97 3.37 14.19 4.53 4.23 2.59 2.19 7.02
1981 4.51 5.54 29.35 38.12 15.70 11.57 2.38 2.50 13.76 3.19 12.55 4.87 3.75 2.25 1.89 6.93
1982 4.27 4.34 26.14 30.20 12.06 8.53 2.04 2.42 14.77 3.01 11.93 4.97 4.25 2.46 1.75 6.04
1983 4.26 4.46 32.87 26.14 11.03 7.90 1.94 2.60 11.22 2.70 13.46 4.63 4.61 2.55 1.99 5.61
1984 4.24 5.00 35.25 24.37 11.19 7.52 1.85 2.76 9.64 2.73 14.41 4.59 4.33 2.65 2.24 4.85
1985 4.34 4.93 37.55 23.70 10.83 7.25 1.72 3.06 7.95 2.96 14.47 4.54 4.35 2.88 2.85 4.51
1986 4.30 5.59 43.30 22.81 21.90 7.86 1.62 3.06 10.34 2.60 14.60 4.33 4.28 2.59 2.43 4.20
1987 4.33 5.62 49.21 23.32 17.73 7.64 1.59 3.33 6.57 2.48 15.05 5.01 4.35 2.66 2.62 4.13
1988 4.52 5.89 53.22 24.38 21.22 7.74 1.67 3.60 5.83 2.63 15.85 5.64 4.28 2.90 2.84 3.86
1989 4.58 6.35 60.80 24.46 21.51 7.65 1.63 3.86 4.54 2.68 15.62 5.70 4.56 2.77 2.63 4.11
1990 4.46 5.71 73.25 20.91 21.42 8.04 1.56 4.01 7.82 2.57 15.91 5.72 4.83 2.42 2.30 3.82
1991 4.77 6.37 82.64 20.79 22.48 7.97 1.50 4.15 8.51 2.69 17.06 6.62 5.18 2.83 2.30 3.94
1992 5.27 7.18 96.03 20.59 25.08 10.10 1.69 4.63 8.55 2.81 19.32 6.81 5.43 3.47 2.59 4.13
1993 5.73 7.21 92.96 22.77 35.94 13.54 2.25 5.09 11.44 2.83 23.30 7.82 5.31 3.65 2.82 5.58
1994 6.40 7.47 65.68 23.57 42.00 14.66 2.26 5.61 9.85 2.71 29.09 7.95 5.50 4.48 4.06 5.50
1995 7.70 7.75 52.85 32.67 90.83 24.03 6.73 7.99 6.06 3.44 30.73 9.14 5.66 6.20 3.19 8.53
1996 7.20 8.88 56.65 30.71 64.42 23.95 4.44 7.18 5.95 3.30 38.62 9.89 6.00 5.52 3.12 6.27
1997 7.59 9.27 57.41 38.24 72.84 20.71 4.99 8.27 7.31 3.64 37.08 9.75 6.61 4.70 3.44 9.63
1952-57 11.20 -5.50 -1.27 4.29 12.50 21.04 8.93 11.61 -3.18 4.48 5.15 9.69 30.40 22.72 23.11 15.34
1958-62 -6.38 -9.00 -11.42 -13.76 -0.50 -9.47 5.77 1.64 -15.92 -16.83 -13.33 -8.93 -1.04 -19.97 -9.84 6.22
1963-65 11.86 17.76 28.71 10.76 7.81 -2.90 -3.35 8.74 4.19 24.43 13.26 6.83 15.21 19.03 -7.00 1.36
1966-70 0.41 -2.98 1.43 0.84 -1.43 14.71 0.34 0.79 0.98 -7.69 3.84 -6.30 0.48 5.95 9.30 -5.64
1971-78 -2.05 0.53 -4.77 -5.87 5.85 -3.26 11.38 -1.49 2.62 -4.95 -6.66 -4.68 1.80 -2.39 -4.87 0.65
1979-87 -0.45 2.47 7.94 -7.69 -4.04 -3.83 -9.69 2.04 -15.30 -1.05 -4.34 7.36 -1.60 0.87 -3.44 1.10
1988-97 5.77 5.14 1.55 5.07 15.18 10.49 12.11 9.53 1.08 3.91 9.43 6.88 4.28 5.88 2.77 8.84
1952-78 1.52 -1.42 -0.89 -2.53 4.61 3.09 5.88 3.13 -2.47 -3.23 -1.73 -1.96 7.44 2.05 1.35 3.19
1979-97 2.78 3.87 4.53 -1.18 5.63 3.46 1.20 5.91 -7.04 1.53 2.68 7.11 1.45 3.48 -0.22 5.10
1952-97 2.05 0.78 1.36 -1.96 5.04 3.24 3.87 4.29 -4.43 -1.25 0.11 1.77 4.87 2.65 0.69 4.00
: Derived based on PPP estimates in Table 2 and the basic time series data for China and the USA as explained in Section 4.
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It may be argued that in a more market-oriented and less distorted economy, more
capital will go to the industries that have some comparative advantage, which will
lead to more rapid increase in marginal productivity of labour of these industries. If
this is the case for the post-reform China, in terms of China-US comparison the
industries in which China has comparative advantage should have enjoyed some
degree of catch up, 		 .
For the manufacturing as a whole in 1952-97 China’s comparative labour
productivity level rose from about 3.0 to 7.6 (USA=100), up by about 2.1 percent a
year. Dividing the time into two periods, the increase was estimated at 1.5 percent per
annum during the central planning period and 2.8 percent per annum during the
reform period (Table 6). While our findings have shown a clear productivity catch-up
in Chinese manufacturing in 1952-97, they have also suggested a long stagnation at
around 4.5 between 1958 and 1990. The results cannot rule out the possibility
suggested by the Szirmai-Ren study (2000) that there was no catch up in Chinese
manufacturing between the early 1980s and the early 1990s.
,*85(
Comparative Performance of Chinese Manufacturing: GVA and GVA per Labourer
in 1987 PPPs, 1952-1997
(USA=100)
& : Based on Tables 5 and 6.
As depicted in Figure 1, from the early 1950s to the mid 1960s the growth of the
comparative output level was accompanied by the growth of the comparative labour
productivity level in Chinese manufacturing, except for the Great Leap Forward
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eventually left far behind by the former. This suggests that the output growth in
Chinese manufacturing in the 1970s and the 1980s was fuelled mainly by the increase
in labour and physical capital inputs rather than technological progress and efficiency
improvement.
A closer examination of the comparative productivity level of Chinese
manufacturing may raise questions about the radical fluctuations of many branches
over the entire period under study. Such fluctuations could be most explained by
abrupt changes in institutions and development policies in the Chinese economy. To
help understand how these changes might have affected China’s position relative to
that of the USA in manufacturing, in both Tables 5 and 6 we provide the growth rates
of both China’s comparative output and labour productivity in different periods,21
even though most of our discussions will focus on a broader division of pre- and post-
reform periods.
When examining the fluctuations of China’s comparative productivity estimates
in Table 6 it is also important to bear in mind the nature of China’s socialist labour
employment system that prevailed under central planning and still to a large extent
remain in the state sector after the reform. Under this employment system, jobs were
allocated through planning authorities rather than the market. Once a job was assigned
to a person it meant a (working) life-time employment thought it was generally not
changeable. Therefore, if no proper capacity adjustment for labour (or for capital as it
could provide some implication for labour capacity in use), the estimated ( 22)
labour productivity could be upward biased if production operation moved from low
to high capacity,23 and downward biased if the opposite happened, other things being
equal.
Comparing the pre- and post-reform periods, the best performer in catch up was
building materials, whose annual growth of comparative productivity rose from -2.0 to
7.1 percent over the two periods. This was followed by wearing apparel (4.6 to 5.6),
                                                
21
 They are, namely, 1) the first five-year plan period (1952-57) when central planning system and
heavy industrialisation strategy were adopted, 2) the Great Leap Forward campaign and its aftermath
(1958-62) when the Maoists attempted to boost both agricultural and industrial output by mass
campaigns but failed, 3) the post-GLF recovery and adjustment period (1963-65) when light industries
were paid some attention, 4) the chaotic period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-70), 5) the period of
“grasping revolution, promoting production” (1971-78) when both heavy industrialisation and rural
industrial development were promoted, 6) the early reform period (1979-87) when an export-oriented
development policy was adopted and 7) the period of deepening reform and matketisation (1988-97).
22
 The 	 labour productivity is calculated based on the   labour productivity of
the countries being compared and their respective PPPs.
23
 It should be noted that in some special cases such as during the Korean War (1951-53) and the
Great Leap Forward (1958-59), workers had to work over their full capacity, that is, 8 hours a day or 48
hours a week.
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tobacco (-0.9 to 4.5) and food (-1.4 to 3.9). Over the two periods, the worst performer
was metals (down from 7.4 to 1.5), followed by wood (down from 5.8 to 1.2),
petroleum (-2.5 to -7.0) and electrical-electronic (1.4 to -0.2) (Table 6). There are,
however, some interesting cases. For example, textiles experienced a process of
falling behind (-2.5 to -1.2), while leather-footwear maintained steady catch up over
the two periods (3.1 to 3.5) (Table 6).
As a result, by 1997 wearing had apparel enjoyed the highest level of
comparative labour productivity (73 percent of the US level), followed by tobacco
(57), textiles (38) and rubber-plastics (37). The electrical-electronic equipment branch
had the lowest level of comparative labour productivity (only 3.4), followed by
chemicals (3.6), machinery (4.7), wood (5.0) and metals (6.6) (Table 6).
The case of textiles may deserve some special attention. Tables 5 and 6 show that
in the 1950s textiles was the largest branch in Chinese manufacturing with a size that
was about 1.6 times that of the USA and a labour productivity that was between a
level similar to and 1.1-1.2 times that of the USA. Is this labour productivity level
plausible for Chinese textiles? Apart from the possible upward bias in the estimates
that are perhaps caused by the lack of labour capacity adjustment as discussed above,
one has to admit that Chinese textile industry should be quite close to its western
counterparts prior to China’s implementation of central planning in the 1950s. Firstly,
China traditionally had strong comparative advantage in textiles which explained why
this industry became the first and, at that time, perhaps the most modernised industry
through foreign trade and investment.24 Secondly, the nature of textile production did
not require heavy investment in technology and human knowledge in which the USA
enjoyed some comparative advantage over China. We could argue that as Table 6
shows, it was the ill-suited central planning system and heavy industry-oriented
government policy that made China fall behind in the industries that China used to
enjoy comparative advantage.
While China’s relatively large size in textiles has maintained for long and even
expanded since the 1980s, its labour productivity has been declining over time. One
possible reason is that prior to the reform textiles in China did not face any
competition while after the reform it only carried on producing low quality products
using the abundant supply of cheap labour. This has made this industry incapable of
adjusting to rapidly changing technologies in textile production that has been driven
by increasingly fierce competition in the world textiles and fashion markets.
                                                
24
 In fact, it mainly concentrated in China’s coastal cities especially the old treaty ports such
Shanghai, Tianjin and Qingdao.
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Our findings, except for textiles, are quite compatible with the factor cost level
across branches that are suggested by the PPP estimates (Table 2). As we argued
above, China’s market-oriented reform has driven those branches with comparative
advantage to grow faster than those without comparative advantage.
The branch level examination further confirms that China’s catch up since the
1990s is a healthy sign as it happened at the time when the industries in which China
has comparative advantage began to enjoy faster growth, the non-state sector started to





This study joins the debate of whether Chinese manufacturing has experienced a
significant catch-up with or a process of falling behind the world’s advanced
economies. It has estimated a new set of industry-of-origin China-US PPPs for major
manufacturing industries at 1987 prices. Then using a newly constructed data set, we
have derived China’s comparative labour productivity level in manufacturing for
1952-97.
Firstly, our findings show a clear productivity catch-up in Chinese manufacturing
in 1952-97, but they have also suggested a long stagnation at around 4.5 between 1958
and 1990. Therefore the results cannot rule out the possibility suggested by the
Szirmai-Ren study (2000) that there was no catch up in Chinese manufacturing
especially during the first decade of the reform.
Secondly, since a clear catch up appeared at the time when the market-oriented
reform deepened and market competition intensified, our findings strongly supports
the conditional catch up hypothesis that the changes made China more capable of
improving economic efficiency as well as adopting new technology (Abramovitz,
1989).
Thirdly, the approach used in this study also helps reassess China’s development
policies during the central planning and reform periods because the production PPPs
could serve as an indicator of factor costs in the countries being compared and hence
the degree of distortion in production structure (resource allocation). Our findings
suggest a clear resource misallocation effect under central planning and a somewhat
healthy shift towards Chinese comparative advantage since the market-oriented
reform.
Lastly, our findings show that industries with comparative advantage have been
the engine of the post-reform growth and catch up. This looks encouraging for China
30
at this time when it is facing a historical opening to international competition that will
follow its WTO entry. It is reasonable to expect that if this catch up continues, more
capital with embodied new technologies would be invested to these industries, which
will lead to further catch-up.
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Basic Data: Chinese Gross Value Added (GVA) and Full-Time Equivalent Employment by Major Manufacturing Branch, Selected Years, 1952-97
1952 1957 1960 1965 1970 1978 1982 1987 1992 1997
GVA (million 1987 yuan):
Food Products & Beverages 1,435 2,506 3,156 3,708 4,098 8,363 14,797 29,174 42,137 55,704
Tobacco Products 1,785 3,004 3,024 3,220 5,274 7,961 12,696 19,405 22,126 22,746
Textile Mill Products 6,939 10,413 11,650 12,465 18,149 23,475 31,310 42,592 51,709 78,760
Wearing Apparel 964 1,274 1,379 1,527 1,452 2,670 3,908 9,124 16,923 54,245
Leather Products & Footwear 211 528 791 387 954 1,734 2,844 4,523 8,614 24,875
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 1,938 3,422 6,751 4,864 4,657 4,775 5,986 6,864 6,341 16,911
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 463 1,138 2,251 2,164 3,014 5,491 7,367 14,271 21,575 34,183
Petroleum Refineries 723 1,211 1,649 2,760 4,619 10,772 11,272 15,930 23,176 32,256
Chemical Products 987 2,903 6,120 7,624 11,353 23,333 30,036 46,296 67,960 116,566
Rubber & Plastic Products 211 469 835 1,285 2,315 4,946 6,826 13,735 25,582 60,511
Building Materials 1,244 3,505 4,457 4,693 6,091 13,149 18,582 32,796 52,255 89,425
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 1,111 4,487 14,846 10,532 15,725 28,525 32,298 50,825 72,105 101,851
Machinery & Transport Equipment 762 4,076 19,596 6,224 14,817 35,667 33,912 61,183 91,116 159,885
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 170 864 5,619 1,402 5,145 10,322 10,082 28,587 51,434 161,688
Other Manufacturing 1,235 2,227 5,743 4,470 6,354 10,388 11,551 14,769 19,454 31,322
Total Manufacturing 20,178 42,025 87,866 67,323 104,018 191,571 233,467 390,072 572,506 1,040,926
Full-Time equivalent employment (x1000):
Food Products & Beverages 648 1,243 2,168 1,418 1,668 2,496 3,487 4,807 5,142 5,321
Tobacco Products 51 79 75 57 69 112 201 267 320 310
Textile Mill Products 1,911 1,896 2,432 1,988 2,435 3,445 6,040 8,529 9,348 7,302
Wearing Apparel 1,311 896 738 731 728 585 1,722 2,176 2,468 2,439
Leather Products & Footwear 172 156 204 155 201 366 704 976 1,126 1,372
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 2,266 2,234 1,177 1,719 1,613 580 1,318 1,545 1,495 1,402
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 381 487 757 533 711 1,172 1,874 2,499 2,806 2,683
Petroleum Refineries 19 32 99 80 117 257 312 449 667 776
Chemical Products 176 328 1,605 723 1,416 3,099 3,764 4,836 6,042 6,423
Rubber & Plastic Products 32 63 185 164 249 749 1,633 2,156 2,509 2,479
Building Materials 571 911 2,639 1,235 2,191 6,182 5,486 7,391 7,192 7,411
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 1,297 1,326 5,465 1,799 2,734 3,894 5,221 6,621 7,336 7,177
Machinery & Transport Equipment 690 1,227 4,013 2,492 4,693 10,734 10,432 12,502 12,966 12,091
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 108 192 596 405 892 1,822 3,079 4,027 4,652 4,890
Other Manufacturing 1,753 1,456 2,000 1,554 2,686 3,204 2,112 2,960 3,579 2,679
Total Manufacturing 11,383 12,526 24,153 15,052 22,403 38,698 47,384 61,740 67,649 64,753
: See Section 4.1 for sources of the data reported here.
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Basic Data: US Gross Value Added (GVA) and Full-Time Equivalent Employment by Major Manufacturing Branch, Selected Years, 1952-97
1952 1957 1960 1965 1970 1978 1982 1987 1992 1997
GVA (million 1987 dollars):
Food Products & Beverages        28,170        32,625        34,071        40,459        45,339        57,539        71,507 79,098        84,595        86,907
Tobacco Products        15,224        15,449        18,055        18,680        21,506        24,982        20,683 10,353          4,395          6,643
Textile Mill Products          5,835          5,996          6,227          9,985        11,948        16,646        16,231 20,137        23,332        22,903
Wearing Apparel        10,092        10,381        11,229        13,815        14,309        20,618        18,764 23,031        24,267        22,732
Leather Products & Footwear          4,171          4,228          4,407          5,333          4,594          5,031          4,579 3,939          4,011          3,441
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures        15,443        15,840        16,261        24,701        25,407        34,570        30,387        46,685        39,113        42,447
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing        34,803        41,689        45,381        58,141        64,892        84,437        84,351        99,830        98,421        94,166
Petroleum Refineries          4,070          4,698          5,562          6,916          7,984          7,306        11,910 22,051        15,986        19,597
Chemical Products        13,397        18,978        21,764        32,370        42,577        64,483        61,036 83,802        91,549      109,309
Rubber & Plastic Products          5,554          5,375          6,519        10,105        12,208        18,751        20,428 29,580        37,851        53,630
Building Materials        12,826        14,553        15,703        19,953        20,530        25,190        17,308 23,313        25,921        32,714
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products        70,245        77,991        69,823        93,586        95,469      107,982        86,982        97,135        93,973      121,384
Machinery & Transport Equipment        71,807        79,880        75,706      112,355      113,090      163,872      146,939      208,890      213,221      314,229
Electrical-Electronic Equipment        11,541        13,033        15,458        25,347        31,416        49,624        58,750 87,640      119,140      296,237
Other Manufacturing        12,537        14,239        15,935        20,429        25,207        38,977        41,207        53,108        55,890        50,912
Total Manufacturing 315,717 354,954 362,102 492,174 536,475 720,009 691,063 888,592 931,664 1,277,251
Full-Time equivalent employment (x1000):
Food Products & Beverages          1,813          1,738          1,705          1,694          1,736          1,686          1,592 1,594 1,614 1,676
Tobacco Products             104               92               90               86               79               67               66 54 47 40
Textile Mill Products          1,144             959             896             907             952             894             722 718 663 620
Wearing Apparel          1,219          1,168          1,177          1,292          1,306          1,295          1,112 1,086 990 830
Leather Products & Footwear             379             362             348             344             310             261             219 147 120 89
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures          1,291          1,134          1,100          1,144          1,173          1,325          1,083          1,325          1,236          1,392
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing          1,307          1,412          1,458          1,579          1,755          1,834          1,900          2,132          2,168          2,239
Petroleum Refineries             231             232             202             178             188             200             191 160 154 135
Chemical Products             712             797             797             875          1,015          1,090          1,075 1,013 1,067 1,023
Rubber & Plastic Products             361             395             402             505             621             773             707 848 870 988
Building Materials             555             567             574             601             610             667             541 561 518 563
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products          2,463          2,612          2,387          2,629          2,796          2,865          2,311          2,127          2,006          2,187
Machinery & Transport Equipment          3,374          3,474          3,124          3,598          3,825          4,341          3,991          4,063          3,770          4,005
Electrical-Electronic Equipment          1,006          1,127          1,223          1,369          1,588          1,714          1,716 1,763 1,525 1,682
Other Manufacturing             914             977             970          1,049          1,178          1,400          1,416          1,367          1,321          1,305
Total Manufacturing 16,876 17,046 16,453 17,851 19,132 20,413 18,642 18,958 18,069 18,774
: See Section 4.2 for sources of the data reported here.
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Matched Output as % of Gross Value of Output (GVO) in the ICOP Comparison in China-US
Manufacturing, 1987













Food Products 124,116 73,653 59.3 271,657 40,152 14.8
Beverages 31,664 16,865 53.3 45,514 9,922 21.8
Food Products & Beverages 155,779 90,518 58.1 317,171 50,074 15.8
Tobacco Products 28,918 28,878 99.9 24,869 16,746 67.3
Textile Mill Products 166,207 6,900 4.2 62,406 6,121 9.8
Wearing Apparel 31,037 31,037 100.0 63,290 3,307 5.2
Leather Products & Footwear 15,539 15,506 99.8 8,812 4,309 48.9
Wood Products, Furniture 21,557 1,482 6.9 108,857 6,325 5.8
Paper, Printing & Publishing 44,329 18,157 41.0 246,455 8,876 3.6
Petroleum Refineries 36,436 26,627 73.1 138,141 84,434 61.1
Chemical Products 140,857 43,431 30.8 216,173 15,308 7.1
Rubber & Plastic Products 46,805 6,273 13.4 86,110 5,106 5.9
Building Materials 80,025 25,943 32.4 60,125 3,469 5.8
Basic & Fabricated Metals 157,056 90,756 57.8 265,543 21,307 8.0
Machinery & Transport Equipment 179,976 30,856 17.1 541,850 168,709 31.1
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 106,371 26,899 25.3 207,254 5,860 2.8
Other Manufacturing 32,557 324 1.0 98,291 8,804 9.0
Total Manufacturing 1,243,451 443,588 35.7 2,445,349* 408,753 16.7
: See Section 4.
: *BEA data, slightly different from the result of the 1987 US Census of Manufacturing figures
US$2,475,901 million.
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Annual Average Growth of Labour Productivity in Chinese Manufacturing,
China Absolute versus China/US Comparative, Selected Periods (in percentage)
1952-78 1978-87 1987-97
China China/US China China/US China China/US
87yuan 87PPPs 87yuan 87PPPs 87yuan 87PPPs
Food Products & Beverages 1.61 -1.42 6.82 2.47 5.60 5.14
Tobacco Products 2.74 -0.89 0.25 7.94 0.11 1.55
Textile Mill Products 2.45 -2.53 -3.39 -7.69 8.00 5.07
Wearing Apparel 7.27 4.61 -0.94 -4.04 18.16 15.18
Leather Products & Footwear 5.33 3.09 -0.25 -3.83 14.61 10.49
Wood Products, Furniture & Fixtures 9.10 5.88 -6.62 -9.69 10.50 12.11
Paper Products, Printing & Publishing 5.32 3.13 2.23 2.04 8.36 9.53
Petroleum Refineries 0.31 -2.47 -1.84 -15.3 1.61 1.08
Chemical Products 1.13 -3.23 2.71 -1.05 6.60 3.91
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.01 -1.73 -0.40 -4.34 14.38 9.43
Building Materials -0.09 -1.96 8.51 7.36 10.52 6.88
Basic & Fabricated Metal Products 8.60 7.44 0.52 -1.6 6.34 4.28
Machinery & Transport Equipment 4.33 2.05 4.40 0.87 10.45 5.88
Electrical-Electronic Equipment 5.03 1.35 2.54 -3.44 16.63 2.77
Other Manufacturing 6.04 3.19 4.91 1.1 8.89 8.84
Total Manufacturing 4.03 1.52 2.75 -0.45 9.79 5.77
: China absolute productivity growth is derived from Appendix Table A1. China/US comparative
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